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I. INTRODUCTION
Political prediction markets captured the public’s imagination during the 
2008 U.S. presidential election cycle.1
* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2010; B.A., Yale University, 2005.  I 
would like to thank Professor John O. McGinnis and Professor Daniel R. Fischel for their invaluable 
insights and guidance, as well as Professor Robert P. Burns, Ira Karoll, Alan Guy, and Owen Keegan
for their support.  Thanks also to the staff of The Pepperdine Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship &
the Law for their superb editorial work.  Finally, I am forever grateful to my loving family.  
Political prediction markets are a relatively 
1 Public interest in political prediction markets during the 2008 presidential election cycle was 
reflected, for example, by two online “blogs”—Freakonomics and Economix—which both kept 
frequent track of developments in these markets leading up to the November 4, 2008 election.  
Prediction Markets—Freakonomics Blog, http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/tag/prediction-
markets/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2008); Prediction Markets—Economix Blog, http://economix.blogs.
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new market mechanism in which members of the public can trade political event 
contracts,2 which are financial agreements that yield payments based on the 
outcome of uncertain events such as the nomination or election of a particular 
candidate.3 Popular interest and optimism about the potential of political 
prediction markets reached a pinnacle with the success of these markets in 
predicting milestones during the 2008 U.S. presidential election.4 One of these 
markets predicted the exact final Electoral College vote counts for each 
presidential candidate.5 Another market predicted from the start of the presidential 
race that the Democratic nominee would win the 2008 popular vote.6 Moreover, 
political prediction markets predicted the 2008 presidential election results more 
accurately than conventional forecasting methods such as polling and expert 
opinion analysis.7
The excitement surrounding political prediction markets has been tempered, 
however, with concerns about manipulation or attempted manipulation in these 
markets.8 Fear of manipulation may constitute the greatest concern that observers 
have about political prediction markets.9 Currently, no laws in the United States 
clearly regulate political prediction markets.10
The only explicitly legal political prediction markets in the United States are 
hosted through the Iowa Electronic Market (“IEM”).11
nytimes.com/tag/prediction-markets/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2008).
  The IEM is a non-profit 
2 This Article uses the term “prediction market” because this appears to be the preferred term in the 
growing literature.  Georgios Tziralis & Ilias Tatsiopoulos, Prediction Markets: An Extended Literature 
Review, 1 J. PREDICTION MARKETS 75, 75 (2007) available at http://gtziralis.googlepages.com/
PredictionMarkets_AnExtendedLiteratureReview_TziralisTatsiopoulos.pdf.
3 See generally Kenneth J. Arrow et al., The Promise of Prediction Markets, 320 SCI. MAG. 877, 
877 (2008) (defining “event contract”), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/320/
5878/877;.see discussion infra Part II.
4 See Joshua Zumbrun, Can Intrade Win After the Election?, FORBES.COM, Nov. 3, 2008, 
http://www.forbes.com/2008/11/03/intrade-prediction-markets-biz-beltway-cx_jz_1103intrade.html.
5 Intrade Exchange News, Visual Presentation of Election 2008 Historical Data, Nov. 14, 2008, 
http://www.intrade.com/news/news_318.html.
6 Press Release, Henry B. Tippie Coll. of Bus., Univ. of Iowa, Democratic Contract Never Trailed 
on IEM’s Winner Take All Prediction Market, Nov. 5, 2008, http://tippie.uiowa.edu/news/story.
cfm?id=2047.
7 For example, whereas the Iowa Electronic Market predicted the final vote count in the 2008 
presidential election to within a half percentage point, the average absolute error by public opinion polls 
was 1.2%.  Press Release, Henry B. Tippie Coll. of Bus., Univ. of Iowa, IEM Within Less Than Half 
Percentage Point in Presidential Race Prediction, Nov. 24, 2008, http://tippie.uiowa.edu/
news/story.cfm?id=2058.
8 See discussion infra Part III.
9 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 137 (2006); see
generally Note, Prediction Markets and Law: A Skeptical Account, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1223–24
(2009) (identifying the vulnerability of political prediction markets to manipulation in the context of 
discussing failures of these markets).
10 Ricky McRoskey, Regulation Looms for Prediction Markets, BUS. WK., July 7, 2008, available 
at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/jul2008/db2008073_533950.htm?chan=top+
news_top+news+index_news+%2B+analysis; see generally Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, 
Prediction Markets and the First Amendment, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 835, 841 (2008) (arguing that 
legal uncertainty is an impediment to the development of public prediction markets generally).
11 Robert Hahn & Paul Tetlock, Op-Ed., Short Odds for Ignorance, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2006, at 
A1.
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prediction market exchange that permits limited real-money trading.12 Event 
contract trading on the IEM is permitted by virtue of two no-action letters issued 
by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”).13 Intrade, which is 
one of the most well-known for-profit, real-money political prediction market 
exchanges, is incorporated in Ireland.14 The absence of a legal framework has 
suppressed the development of these markets in the United States,15 and has 
arguably reduced the opportunities that these markets have to encourage broader 
participation, aggregate information, and improve decision-making.16 Numerous 
participants in the prediction market industry have pleaded for regulatory clarity.17
In the spring of 2008, the CFTC sought public commentary in the form of a 
Concept Release on the appropriate regulatory treatment of event contracts traded 
on prediction markets generally.18 The CFTC issued this call for public comment 
in response to a “substantial number of requests for guidance on the propriety of 
trading various event contracts under the regulatory rubric of the Commodity 
Exchange Act (“CEA” or “Act”).”19 Leaders in the prediction market industry are 
hopeful that legal clarity from the CFTC will improve public confidence in these 
markets and increase market liquidity through a significantly higher volume of 
trading.20
As part of its review, the CFTC is currently examining whether political 
event contracts should be prohibited, or deserve special treatment, under the CEA, 
“due to the nature and importance of their outcomes.”21 The CFTC is also 
analyzing whether any types of market participants or trading practices exist on 
prediction markets generally that should be prohibited or closely monitored by 
regulators.22 The agency was expected to issue a response to questions posed in 
the Concept Release during 2009 in the form of an interpretive statement, a 
proposed rulemaking, or an exemptive order, but as of early 2010 the agency has 
issued no response at all.23
12 Frequently Asked Questions—Iowa Electronic Markets—The University of Iowa, http://www.
biz.uiowa.edu/iem/faq.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2008).
13 Id. A no-action letter is a discretionary written statement issued to a specific futures exchange 
by the staff of a Division of the CFTC or the Office of the General Counsel, stating that the Division or 
Office will not recommend enforcement action to the CFTC against the futures exchange for the 
exchange’s failure to comply with a specific provision of the Commodities Exchange Act or a 
Commission rule.  17 C.F.R. §§ 140.99(a)(2), 140.99(b) (West 2009).
14 See Intrade.com—Help, http://www.intrade.com/jsp/intrade/help/index.jsp?page=howitworks.
html (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
15 See Arrow et al., supra note 3, at 877–78.
16 Id. at 878.
17 See, e.g., Melonyce McAfee, Are “Political Futures” Illegal?, SLATE, Apr. 27, 2007,
http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2164916.
18 Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts, 73 Fed. Reg. 
25,669, (May 7, 2008).
19 Id.
20 Zumbrun, supra note 4.
21 Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts, 73 Fed. Reg. at 
25,673.
22 Id. at 25,674.
23 E-mails from Bruce Fekrat, Special Counsel, Office of the Director, Division of Market 
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Prediction market scholars disagree about whether the CFTC legally can
regulate public prediction markets generally under the CEA,24 or whether state 
gambling laws should regulate these markets.25
The incoherence results because the concepts of artificial price and specific 
intent to influence market price that are central to the CEA’s anti-manipulation 
jurisprudence are inapplicable in the context of political prediction markets.  After 
abandoning the CEA’s anti-manipulation jurisprudence, the CFTC will have at 
least three options with regard to regulating the manipulation we worry about in 
political prediction markets: it can develop a revised anti-manipulation doctrine 
with elements that are coherent when applied to political election markets; it can 
encourage private contracting between market participants to prohibit certain 
trading activities; or it can take no action and simply allow political prediction 
markets themselves to control manipulation through self-deterrence mechanisms.
This Article does not address 
these questions.  Rather, this Article argues that if the CFTC acquires jurisdiction 
over political prediction markets specifically, it must abandon the CEA’s anti-
manipulation jurisprudence toward these markets.  This argument is raised because 
the CEA’s regulatory rubric is incoherent when applied to the types of activities 
and effects that market analysts, participants and observers consider manipulative 
in political prediction markets.
Part II of this Article offers a brief background to prediction markets 
generally.  Part III catalogues five examples of activity considered manipulative in 
political prediction markets, and draws conclusions about the types of trading 
activities that trouble market analysts.  Part IV addresses the CEA’s current anti-
manipulation jurisprudence, and explains why this jurisprudence is incoherent 
when applied to manipulation in political prediction markets.  Part V suggests 
three alternatives to the CEA’s anti-manipulation jurisprudence to control 
manipulation in political prediction markets: a new regulatory scheme, private 
contractual enforcement, or self-deterrence.  Part VI concludes by urging the 
CFTC, if it acquires jurisdiction over political prediction markets, to exercise 
Oversight, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, to Alexandra Lee Newman, J.D. Candidate, 
Northwestern University School of Law (Oct. 9, 2008, 11:56 CST, Jan. 14, 2009, 08:56 CST, and Oct. 
13, 2009, 09:13 CST) (on file with author).
24 For arguments favoring CFTC regulation, see generally MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ,
PREDICTOCRACY 50 (2007); Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, A New Approach for Regulating 
Information Markets, 29 J. REG. ECON. 265, 268, 272–80 (2006); Paul Architzel, Event Markets Evolve: 
Legal Certainty Needed, FUTURES INDUSTRY, Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 53, available at http://www.future
sindustry.org/downloads/fimag/2006/marapr06/Mar-Apr_EventMarkets.pdf; Kenneth J. Arrow et al., 
Statement on Prediction Markets 2 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper,
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=984584.  For arguments opposing CFTC regulation, see 
generally Tom W. Bell, Private Prediction Markets and the Law, 3 J. PREDICTION MARKETS 89 (2009),
available at http://tomwbell.com/writings/PrivatePMs&theLaw.pdf [hereinafter Bell, Private Prediction 
Markets]; Tom W. Bell, Prediction Markets for Promoting the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts,
14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 37, 67–77 (2006); Tom W. Bell, Architzel on Legality of Prediction Markets,
Mar. 29, 2006, http://agoraphilia.blogspot.com/2006/03/architzel-on-legality-of-prediction.html [herein
after Bell, Science and the Useful Arts].
25 See generally, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Gambling for the Good, Trading for the Future: The Legality 
of Markets in Science Claims, 5 CHAP. L. REV. 159, 165–67 (2002) (arguing that prediction markets are 
distinct from gambling); Ryan P. McCarthy, Comment, Information Markets as Games of Chance, 155 
U. PA. L. REV. 749, 755 (2007).  But cf. Christopher T. Pickens, Comment, Of Bookies and Brokers: 
Are Sports Futures Gambling or Investing, and Does It Even Matter?, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 227, 
269 (2006) (arguing that a distinction between gambling and investing is nonsensical because the 
activities “are too similar to distinguish categorically”).
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restraint in the regulation of manipulative trading, in order to promote further 
experimentation and development of these markets.
II. BACKGROUND TO PREDICTION MARKETS
Public prediction markets, of which political prediction markets are a type, 
are markets in which members of the public can trade event contracts, which are 
financial agreements that yield payments based on the outcome of uncertain 
events.26 A public prediction market is contrasted with a private or “in-house”
prediction market, where the prediction market is only open to members of a 
particular firm.27 The uncertain event that lays the foundation for the event 
contract on a public prediction market can range from the results of a presidential 
election to the occurrence of a scientific discovery to the length of a celebrity 
marriage.28
A typical event contract in a political prediction market specifies a single 
uncertain event as follows: “Barack Obama to be elected President of the United 
States in 2008.” Only two possibilities exist for the outcome of this contract: 
either Barack Obama will be elected President of the United States in 2008, or he 
will not.  This type of event contract is known as a binary-option contract,29
To participate in a typical public prediction market, a buyer purchases a 
binary-option contract from a market sponsor such as the IEM or Intrade, which 
issues contracts linked to various event outcomes and facilitates trades between 
buyers and sellers.
and it 
is the most prevalent type of event contract traded today.  The name reflects the 
fact that there are only two possibilities for the outcome of the contract.
30 The price that the buyer pays for the contract indicates the 
lowest probability at which the buyer thinks the event will occur (the buyer wants 
to buy the contract for the lowest possible price).31 The seller will sell the share at 
a price that exceeds his purchase price, and the seller’s willingness to sell the 
contract at the buyer’s offered price indicates the highest probability at which the 
seller thinks the event will occur (the seller naturally wants to obtain the highest 
price possible for the sale of the contract).32
26 Arrow et al., supra note 
When all of the event contracts for a 
3, at 877.  For additional background information, see generally, e.g.,
Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Markets for Markets: Origins and Subjects of Information 
Markets, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 339 (2006) (providing in-depth introduction to prediction markets).
27 Bell, Private Prediction Markets, supra note 24, at 14.
28 Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts, 73 Fed. Reg. at, 
25,670.
29 Id.  Binary-option contracts are traded on both the IEM and Intrade.
30 These market sponsors, which are often online forums, are analogous to the clearing houses 
familiar in the commodity futures contract trading context.  See generally U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, The Economic Purpose of Futures Markets and How They Work
http://www.cftc.gov/educationcenter/economicpurpose.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2010) (“Futures trades 
that are made on an exchange are cleared through a clearing organization (clearing house), which acts 
as the buyer to all sellers and the seller to all buyers.”).
31 See generally Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, and 
Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 933, 934–44 (2004) (“The prices at which these 
transactions occur, as well as the bid and ask prices, reflect market predictions of the eventual payout 
and thus of the number or numbers on which that payout is based.”).
32 Id.
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specific event are aggregated on a prediction market, the price of the event contract 
on the market represents the average perceived likelihood that the event will 
actually occur—this is the “aggregated expected probability” of the event.33
For example, the buyer selects the event in which she is interested—”Barack 
Obama to be elected President of the United States in 2008.” This binary-option 
contract will pay $1 if Barack Obama is elected, but will pay $0 if he is not 
elected.  Therefore, if the buyer purchases the contract for $0.85, the buyer has 
expressed her belief that Barack Obama has an 85% or greater chance of winning 
the 2008 U.S. presidential election.  By selling the contract for $0.85, the seller has 
indicated his belief that the price of the Barack Obama contract will not exceed 
$0.85, and that Barack Obama has less than an 85% chance of being elected.  If 
Barack Obama is actually elected, the buyer will receive $1, thus making $0.15 
profit on that event contract.  Market participants who bought contracts favoring 
other presidential candidates will receive nothing.
The virtues of public prediction markets are manifold.  Functioning as 
“information aggregation vehicles,”34 prediction markets may boast predictive 
accuracy exceeding the precision of other predictive processes such as 
deliberation,35 polling, or expert opinion-making.36 For example, one research 
study found that political prediction markets are more accurate long-run 
forecasting tools in political elections than political polls both across elections and 
across long periods of time preceding elections.37 This study aggregated over 964 
polls from the five U.S. presidential elections since 1988, and concluded that the 
political prediction market was closer to the final two-party vote split 74% of the 
time.38 This study also concluded that the political prediction market significantly 
outperformed the polls in each of these elections when forecasting more than 100 
days in advance of the election.39
Cass Sunstein argues that this predictive accuracy arises because prediction 
markets provide incentives for the disclosure of information.40
Precisely because many people are making purchasing decisions, their aggregate 
He theorizes:
33 The term “aggregated expected probability” appears in Chris F. Masse’s prediction market blog, 
CFM = Prediction Markets—Vortal to Prediction Markets, http://www.chrisfmasse.com (last visited 
Mar. 11, 2009).
34 Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts, 73 Fed. Reg. at 
25,670.
35 SUNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 104.
36 See Arrow et al., supra note 3, at 877; Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, 18 J.
ECON. PERSP. 107, 108 (2004). The methods and processes of information aggregation in public 
prediction markets is currently an active area for empirical investigation.  See Katarína Kálovcová, Why 
Betting and Prediction Markets Work (Not) Well: An Inventory of Open Questions, 19–20 (CERGE-EI,
Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 2007-178, 2007), available at http://home.cerge-ei.cz/kalovcova/
files/dp.pdf.
37 Joyce E. Berg et al., Prediction Market Accuracy in the Long Run, 24 INT’L J. FORECASTING
285, 286 (2008), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6V92-
4SCTMTB-1-
H&_cdi=5886&_user=1458830&_orig=search&_coverDate=06%2F30%2F2008&_sk=999759997&vi
ew=c&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkzk&md5=432bb517cf9e9ac013d22dc6822b18ef&ie=/sdarticle.pdf.
38 Id. at 287.
39 Id.
40 SUNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 104.
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judgments are highly likely to be correct, at least if most purchasers have relevant 
information.  And simply because purchasers are purchasers, and hence are willing 
to put money on the line, they probably do have some such information, at least 
most of the time. . . . When people are willing to put their money where their mouth 
is, there is an increased likelihood that they will be right.41
The information aggregation feature of prediction markets is enhanced by the fact 
that these markets have the potential to be completely objective since “they 
provide financial incentive for honest predictions.”42
Information aggregation can occur quickly, which is another virtue of the 
markets.43 For example, on November 8, 1995, at 8:10 a.m. CST, Colin Powell 
announced that he would be holding a press conference later that afternoon, but 
revealed no explicit information about the content of that conference.44 Traders on 
the IEM reacted quickly to this announcement, and within minutes the price of the 
Colin Powell Nomination Market for the 1996 Republican National Convention 
dropped from $0.60 to almost zero.45 This drop occurred more than seven hours in 
advance of the press conference at which Powell actually made the announcement 
that he would not campaign for the nomination.46
While rapid information aggregation is the most prominent virtue of public 
prediction markets, scholars postulate other virtues as well.  Public prediction 
markets may promote free speech,47 democratic deliberation,48 public decision 
making,49 scientific progress,50 and risk management.51 Given these potential 
virtues, it is no wonder that some scholars “wish that anything even remotely
resembling a prediction market be free to thrive, in order that this important field 
might enjoy the optimal conditions for growth.”52
Other commentators, however, are more cautious in their enthusiasm for 
prediction markets.  For example, one scholar has observed that prediction markets 
are valuable only as long as they maintain a competitive advantage in making 
41 Id. at 121.
42 Abramowicz, supra note 31, at 971.  For a famous version of the argument that betting 
encourages the expression of objective belief, see generally IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE
REASON 687 (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood eds., trans., 1998).
43 Joyce E. Berg et al., The Iowa Electronic Markets: Stylized Facts and Open Issues, in
INFORMATION MARKETS: A NEW WAY OF MAKING DECISIONS 142, 152 (Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. 
Tetlock eds., 2006), available at http://reg-markets.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-safely.php?fname=../
pdffiles/phpoY.pdf; see also Yiling Chen et al., Information Markets vs. Opinion Polls: An Empirical 
Comparison 9 (Working Paper, 2005) (“[I]nformation markets can provide real-time predictions, which 
are hardly achievable through resorting to experts.”).
44 Berg, supra note 43, at 152.
45 Id.
46 Id. 
47 See Cherry & Rogers, supra note 10, at 835, 875.
48 See John O. McGinnis, Who Will Be President?, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2008, at A13; John O. 
McGinnis, A Democracy of Accelerating Technology 22 (Working Paper, 2008); SUNSTEIN, supra note 
9, at vii.
49 Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, Using Information Markets to Improve Public Decision 
Making, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 213 (2005).
50 See Bell, Science and the Useful Arts, supra note 24.
51 See Arrow et al., supra note 3, at 877.
52 Cherry & Rogers, supra note 10, at 835, 878.
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accurate predictions relative to other forecasting models—”[a] highly accurate set 
of prediction markets has little value if some other meta predictive mechanism(s) 
can provide similar accuracy at a lower cost, or if very few substantial decisions 
are influenced by accurate predictions on its topic.”53
Another concern is that prediction markets may merely reflect information 
that is already available, rather than actually predict new information.54 In one 
recent study, economists postulated that the 2008 U.S. presidential prediction 
markets merely reacted to the release of polling information, and did not actually 
anticipate any significant changes in voter sentiment.55
Moreover, prediction markets may be susceptible to various types of “foul 
play,” including lying, sabotage, embezzlement, retribution, vulnerability to 
bubbles or information cascades, bias, or other possible weaknesses.56 Market 
observers are also concerned about particular applications of prediction markets,
such as those used to predict terrorist attacks, assassinations, and nuclear missile 
attacks.57
This Article does not address these concerns, but rather focuses on the legal 
concept of manipulation as it pertains to trading activities on political prediction 
markets.  Part III offers five examples of activities and effects that market analysts 
have considered manipulative in political prediction markets.  
III. EXAMPLES OF MANIPULATION IN POLITICAL PREDICTION MARKETS
Over the past several years, political prediction market analysts in the 
popular media and academia have identified activities constituting manipulation in 
these markets.  Most commentators identifying manipulated markets have not 
explicitly defined the term manipulation.  However, it appears that all of these 
commentators have implicitly adopted the definition of manipulation recently 
asserted by Paul W. Rhode and Koleman S. Strumpf.58
53 CFM = Prediction Markets, supra note 33.
Rhode and Strumpf define 
manipulation in political prediction markets as a “speculative attack that achieves 
its objective of changing prices” that is “usually not possible unless the trades 
54 See ABRAMOWICZ, supra note 24, at 38.
55 David S. Lee & Enrico Moretti, Learning in Investment Decisions: Evidence from Prediction 
Markets and Polls 2 (Am. Econ. Ass’n, Working Paper, 2008), available at http://www.aeaweb.org/
annual_mtg_papers/2009/retrieve.php?pdfid=360.
56 See generally Yiling Chen et al., Bluffing and Strategic Reticence in Prediction Markets 1 
(Working Paper, 2007) available at http://www.yiling.seas.harvard.edu/files/wine082.pdf (“[T]here 
exist circumstances when traders can benefit by either hiding information (reticence) or lying about 
information (bluffing).”); Robin Hanson, Foul Play in Information Markets, in INFORMATION 
MARKETS, supra note 43, at 126, 130 (analyzing various forms of foul play in prediction markets); 
Note, Prediction Markets and Law, supra note 9, at 1221-24 (identifying situations where prediction 
markets “go wrong”).
57 See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 106-08 (providing background information on the 
controversial Policy Analysis Market).
58 Paul W. Rhode & Koleman S. Strumpf, Manipulating Political Stock Markets: A Field 
Experiment and a Century of Observational Data 6 (Working Paper, 2008), available at 
http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/ManipIHT_June2008(KS).pdf. 
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influence the beliefs of other market participants.”59 A speculative attack is “any 
trade uninformed by fundamentals, intended to change prices,” and a fundamental
is “any information that influences the underlying value of the contract.”60
Pursuant to this definition, political prediction market commentators find in 
the five examples below that attempted manipulation has occurred when it appears 
that a trader has purchased contracts attempting to influence the perception that 
other people have about the viability of a particular candidate.  Manipulation is 
successful when these perceptions actually are influenced.  The manipulative 
trader does not necessarily purchase contracts with the hope of making a profit.  In 
fact, the manipulative trader often loses money on the trade, even intentionally, 
and is unable to affect the price of the contract substantially or in the long-term. 
A. September/October 2008: “John McCain Wins Presidency” Contracts on 
Intrade
In September and October, 2008, trading activity occurred in the John 
McCain contract on Intrade that raised concerns.  As Intrade CEO John Delaney 
described the questionable trading, “[m]ultiple large volume Buy orders placed and 
matched rapidly caused the McCain market to move significantly above the 
previously prevailing market price by up to 10 pts,” while at the same time 
“[m]ultiple large volume Sell orders placed and matched rapidly caused the Obama 
market to move significantly below the previously prevailing market price by up to 
9 pts.”61
From a public relations perspective, Delaney analyzed these transactions by 
explaining that a single “institutional” investor on Intrade had purchased a large 
number of McCain contracts in order to “manage certain risks.”62 Other market 
observers, however, described the trading as “manipulative.”63 The New York 
Times reported that the price of McCain contracts on Intrade was up to ten points 
higher than the price of McCain stock on other large online prediction markets 
such as Britain’s BetFair market.64
One commentator observed that this price discrepancy between the different 
public prediction markets created arbitrage opportunities.
The discrepancies between the same types of 
contracts on different election prediction markets raised concerns about the 
integrity of these markets.  
65
59 Id. (emphasis added).
This type of 
60 Id.
61 John Delaney, http://delaneyintrade.blogspot.com/2008_10_01_archive.html (Oct. 16, 2008, 
06:40 EST).
62 Id.
63   See generally Noam Cohen, Trading Variance in Election Predictions Raises Questions, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at B4 (discussing John Delaney’s response to allegations of market 
manipulation).
64 Id.
65 Nate Silver, Intrade Betting is Suspicious, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT: POLITICS DONE RIGHT, Sept. 24, 
2008, http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2008/09/intrade-betting-is-suspcious.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2010).  Arbitrage is “the simultaneous buying and selling of identical securities in different markets, 
with the hope of profiting from the price difference in those markets.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 14
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opportunity was found on September 24, 2008—the Obama contract on Intrade 
was trading at 52.3, suggesting that Obama had a 52.3% chance of being elected 
president.66 At the same time, on the BetFair prediction market site, Obama 
contracts were trading at 1.62, suggesting that Obama had a 61.7% chance of 
winning the presidency.67
The Wall Street Journal observed that in addition to price disparity with 
other markets, McCain contracts were being traded at high volume during unusual 
times, such as early in the morning, during periods of relative political calm.
A savvy investor could make a substantial profit by
purchasing Obama contracts for a lower price on Intrade and then selling them for 
a higher price on BetFair.
68
The New York Times offered a “political explanation” for the increased value 
of McCain contracts to explain the trading activity of those contracts: 
Such timing raised concerns that a manipulator’s hand was involved. 
The political explanation—that someone was trying to game the system to give Mr. 
McCain some momentum—has the advantage of at least appearing rational to 
economists.  Increasing a candidate’s perceived standing would be something of 
value to offset the irrational decision to waste money buying a share in Mr. McCain 
for more than the absolute minimum price.69
Similarly, Justin Wolfers of the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton 
School of Business noted that whoever bought the large number of McCain 
contracts was “obviously someone who want[ed] good news for McCain.”70
[T]he trader placing the suspicious orders moved the contracts to price levels that 
weren’t sustained, so it’s nearly impossible that they made money on the 
transaction.  That suggests to us that the trader had an ulterior motive, such as a 
desire to raise Sen. McCain’s stock and alter the public perception of how the 
horserace was unfolding.
As 
reported in the Wall Street Journal:
71
The fact that the non-manipulative prediction market participants quickly 
identified the manipulative inflationary trading of the McCain contract meant that 
the manipulative trader likely lost thousands of dollars.72
Highlighting the possibility of unsavory motivations held by manipulative 
traders, Nate Silver of the political blog fivethirtyeight.com observed that on 
  This suggests that the 
manipulative trader had incentives that went beyond financial gain from the 
market.  
(8th ed. 2004).
66 Silver, supra note 65.
67 Id.
68 David Rothschild & Justin Wolfers, Market Manipulation Muddies Election Outlook, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 2, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122283114935193363.html.
69 Cohen, supra note 63.
70 Josh Rogin, Trader Drove Up Price of McCain ‘Stock’ in Online Market, CONG. Q., Oct. 21, 
2008, available at http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?docID=news-000002976265&referrer=js.
71 Rothschild & Wolfers, supra note 68.
72 Elizabeth Dickinson, Future Perfect, FOREIGN POL’Y, Oct. 2008, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
story/cms.php?story_id=4541&page=1.
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September 22, 2008, a “rogue trader” who bought large volumes of McCain 
contracts was also purchasing Hillary Clinton contracts.73 Silver hypothesized that 
“someone is betting on some sort of disqualifying event happening to Obama,”74
and he encouraged the FBI to uncover the rogue trader’s identity.75
These various analyses suggest that whereas a rational economic actor would 
not risk losing money by purchasing McCain contracts for more than their market 
value, a rational political actor would purchase a large number of McCain’s 
Intrade contracts to make the probability of a McCain victory appear higher to 
outside observers.  The goal of the manipulative trader would be to influence the 
beliefs that other market observers had about the viability of McCain’s candidacy.
B. May 2007: “Hillary Clinton Wins Presidency” Contracts on Intrade
In May 2007, economist Eric Zitzewitz observed that the “Hillary Clinton for 
President” contract, which had been trading consistently between twenty-three and 
twenty-six points on Intrade, suddenly increased to forty points around May 12.76
With her odds of winning the Democratic nomination hovering around fifty
percent, these numbers implied that, if nominated, Hillary Clinton’s chance of 
winning the presidency would be about eighty percent.77
Zitzewitz noted that this price was “clearly ridiculous” for two reasons: first, 
“[y]ou could sell the President contracts of Hillary, Obama, Gore, and Edwards for 
a combined 69 (40+17+8+4) and buy the ‘Democrat to win’ contract for 56,” and 
second, “[s]ince there was no movement in the nomination contract, the 
conditional probability of Hillary was now a ridiculous 40/52 = 77%, while the 
conditional probability of ‘Not Hillary’ was 16/48 = 33%.”78
Additionally, Zitzewitz observed that the “Hillary Clinton for President”
contract price stayed at forty points for about a week on higher than normal 
volume, suggesting that someone was putting a very large amount of money into 
the market and sustaining that investment at a high level.
The first reason 
raised red flags because it defied logic why an aggregated bundle of contracts 
indicating that one of the four major Democratic candidates would win the 
presidency would cost substantially more than a single contract predicting 
generally that a Democrat would win.  The second reason was odd because the 
conditional contract predicting that Clinton would win the presidency if she were 
nominated suggested that Clinton was a significantly more popular candidate than 
the contract predicting the likelihood of her nomination suggested. 
79
73 Silver, supra note 65.
Overall, Zitzewitz 
74 Id.
75 Id. (“Still, if I were the Secret Service FBI (**), I would probably want to know the identity of 
this trader.”).
76 Eric Zitzewitz, Manipulation Can Affect Prices, May 30, 2007, http://www.midasoracle.org/
2007/05/30/manipulation-can-affect-prices/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
77 Tim Harford, Hillary’s Odds: Can You Rig the Political Betting Markets?, SLATE, July 7, 2007, 
available at http://www.slate.com/id/2169647/.
78 Zitzewitz, supra note 76.
79 Id.
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concluded that this market participant spent $10,000 to increase the price of 
“Hillary Clinton for President” contracts by twelve points over the course of two 
weeks.80
Similar to the John McCain contract above,81 the question arises whether a 
Hillary Clinton supporter was trying to manipulate the market to make Clinton’s
success in the market a self-fulfilling prophecy at the polls, or whether a rival 
candidate was trying to make the Clinton camp look manipulative.82
C.  October 2004: “George W. Bush Wins Presidency” Contracts on 
TradeSports
At any rate, 
astute Intrade investors who noticed the overvalued “Hillary Clinton for President”
contracts had the opportunity, even two weeks after the start of the allegedly 
manipulative activity, to make “free money” by selling their contracts purchased 
before the activity at the “true” price of twenty-six points to other market 
participants who bid for “Hillary Clinton for President” contracts valued at thirty-
three points and higher after the attempted manipulation.  
Prediction market analysts also observed attempted manipulation in the fall 
of 2004 “George W. Bush Wins Presidency” contracts on TradeSports (formerly 
part of Intrade).83
Shortly after 2:30 pm (EDT) on Friday, October 15, 2004, the TradeSports odds 
price on the re-election of President Bush began to fall precipitously.  From a 
plateau of 54 points at 2:30 pm, a series of thirty trades in less than a second 
dropped the price to 48 at 2:31 pm.  After stabilizing for two minutes, another rapid 
set of trades led prices to tumble to 10 at 2:33 pm.  Thus prices fell by 44 points in 
just three minutes, suggesting that Bush went from a slight favorite to serious 
underdog.
Economists Paul Rhode and Koleman Strumpf summarize the 
trades as follows:
84
Rhode and Strumpf note that the manipulator spent around $20,000 in an 
attempt to alter the market, but likely did not make any profit from his efforts.85
The price impact of these trades was reversed within twenty-four hours.86
Discussing the trader’s motivations, one commentator suggested, “either 
someone was drunk, or a political hack made a crass attempt to change the 
odds.”87
This sharp drop was the most dramatic of a series of trades that National Review 
Online blogger Donald Luskin soon charged were politically-motivated speculative 
attacks on Bush futures “to sway the election towards Kerry.” Reports circulated 
Rhode and Strumpf wrote:
80 Harford, supra note 77.
81 See supra Part IV.A.
82 Id.
83 Rhode & Strumpf, supra note 58, at 2-3.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 35, 37.
86 Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 36, at 23. 
87 Harford, supra note 77.
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that George Soros was behind the October 15 plunge as well as earlier bear raids on 
Bush.  Such rumors gained currency when a TradeSports press release, publicized 
in Wall Street Journal and Time, confirmed that the large trades of a single investor 
produced the October 15 price moves.  The press release asserted “Bush contract 
has become the battle ground of wills between a cadre of large, well financed rogue 
traders seemingly bent on driving down the Bush re-election contract and a 
growing list of financial traders who think they can predict the outcome of this 
election.”88
Under the Rhode and Strumpf definition of attempted manipulation, the 
trader sought to influence the political decisions of market observers, and to use 
market prices as a means of doing so.  
D.  Year 2000: “Patrick Buchanan for President” Contracts on IEM
Cass Sunstein observed that an attempt to manipulate a political prediction 
market occurred during the 2000 presidential election.89 The value of the contracts 
for Patrick Buchanan increased suddenly after a group of traders bought large 
volumes of these contracts, but the price soon dropped when other “well-informed 
traders” sold these contracts for a profit.90
E. Year 1999: “FDP Party to Win Berlin State Election” Contracts on 
Wahl$treet
Sunstein does not define the meaning of 
attempted manipulation, but from his description it appears that he implicitly 
adopted the Rhode and Strumpf definition.  Sunstein’s description suggests that
manipulation involves an effort to increase the price of a candidate’s contracts 
through high-volume purchasing to signal the candidate’s popularity to other 
market observers.  
Economists Jan Hansen, Carsten Schmidt and Martin Strobel identified 
unusual trading activity in political prediction markets that were run during the 
1999 Berlin state election.91  Two independent political prediction markets were 
conducted to predict the outcome of this election.92 One of these markets, the 
Walboerse market run through the Humboldt University Berlin and the newspaper 
Berliner Zeitung, took about one week to enroll new market participants.93
88 Rhode & Strumpf, supra note 58, at 2-3 (citing Donald Luskin, Who’s Behind the Bush-Futures 
Attacks?, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Oct. 18, 2004, http://www.nationalreview.com/nrof_luskin/ luskin2004
10181132.asp; Donald Luskin, Bush Futures Being Manipulated, Oct. 16, 2004, http://www.poorand
stupid.com/2004_10_10_chronArchive.asp; Amanda Ripley, Let’s Make This Vote Interesting, Shall 
We?, TIME, Nov. 1, 2004, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/ 0,9171,995538,00.
html; Bids and Offers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2004, at C4).
In 
contrast, the Wahl$treet prediction market run through the daily newspapers Der 
89 SUNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 137-38.
90 Id.  
91 Jan Hansen et al., Manipulation in Political Stock Markets—Preconditions and Evidence, 11 
APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 459 (2004), available at http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=
all~content=a713691811~tab=content.
92 Id. at 460.
93 Id. at  461.
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Tagesspiegel and Berliner Morgenpost enabled new market participants to trade 
instantly upon enrollment.94 All three of the newspapers involved published the 
daily results of the vote share-contracts on the first page of their Berlin editions for 
six weeks preceding the election.95
The headquarters of the liberal Free Democratic Party (“FDP”) party sent out 
an email message to all Berlin FDP party members eleven days prior to the 
election.96 In this email, party members were encouraged to enroll in the 
Wahl$treet prediction market and to purchase FDP party stock, in order to increase 
the demand, and thus the price, of the FDP contracts on the Wahl$treet market.97
The Tagesspiegel is publishing a PSM on a daily basis, according to which the FDP
is traded at 4.23% at the moment. You find the PSM on the internet at 
http://berlin.wahlstreet.de.  Many citizens do not think of the PSM as a game, but 
consider it a result of opinion polls.  Hence, it is important that the price of the FDP
will rise during the last days.  As is the case with every exchange, the price level is 
a result of the demand.  Please participate at the PSM and buy FDP contracts.  
Eventually, we are all convinced of the success of our party.
Discussing these political stock markets (“PSMs”), the email read:
98
Shortly after this email was sent, the FDP prices began to increase slowly on 
the Wahl$treet market, up until the day of the last newspaper announcement of the 
Wahl$treet prediction price favoring the FDP party.99 After the final 
announcement at 4:00 p.m. on the eve of the election day, the FDP price at 
Wahl$treet fell by thirty percent, suggesting that people had purchased FDP 
contracts solely to increase the reported probability of an FDP victory.100
Strikingly, similar price increases did not occur on the Wahlboerse market where 
enrollment was not instantaneous, as it was on Wahl$treet.101
Like the other examples above, the discussion of the 1999 Berlin state 
election conforms to Rhode and Strumpf’s definition of manipulation.  The FDP 
party organizers sought to influence the beliefs of external market observers by 
increasing the price of the FDP contract, hoping that a higher contract price would 
motivate observers to support the FDP at the polls.  Rhode and Strumpf note that a 
manipulator’s actions in increasing the price of a contract “might influence the 
choice of undecided voters, either directly or through the media.”102
94 Id.
Because of 
this influence, some scholars suggest that an extreme solution to avoiding 
manipulative effects in political prediction markets is to prevent media coverage of 
95 Id. at 460.
96 Hansen et al., supra note 91, at 460.
97 Id. at 460-461.
98 Jan Hansen et al., Manipulation in Political Stock Markets – Preconditions and Evidence 5-6
(Working Paper, 2001), available at http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/series/sfb-373-papers/2001-61/PDF/61.
pdf.
99 Hansen et al., supra note 91, at 461.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 462.
102 Rhode & Strumpf, supra note 58, at 7.
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prediction market results.103 It is unlikely that such a solution would be viable or 
even legal in the United States.104
IV. THE INCOHERENCE OF THE CEA’S ANTI-MANIPULATION JURISPRUDENCE AS 
APPLIED TO POLITICAL PREDICTION MARKETS
The five examples of trading activities in political prediction markets above 
comply with the Rhode and Strumpf definition of manipulation, which heavily 
emphasizes the trader’s hope that the trades will influence the beliefs of other 
market participants through the price changes in the market, regardless of whether 
the manipulative trader sought to or actually did make a profit.105
Whereas the adopted concept of manipulation in political prediction markets 
depends on the attempt or ability to influence external beliefs, the CEA’s doctrine 
depends upon the concepts of artificial price and specific intent to influence the 
market price.  In what follows, this Article summarizes the CEA’s anti-
manipulation doctrine, and argues that the CEA’s concepts of artificial price and 
specific intent to influence the market price are incoherent as applied to political 
prediction markets.  No other prediction market commentator has engaged in this 
type of sustained analysis of why the CEA’s traditional doctrine of manipulation in 
commodity futures market is incoherent when applied to public prediction 
markets.
This concept of 
manipulation is markedly different from the CEA’s anti-manipulation doctrine.  
106
A. Background to the CEA’s Anti-Manipulation Jurisprudence
This Article argues that if the CFTC eventually acquires jurisdiction 
over political prediction markets, it must abandon the CEA’s anti-manipulation 
jurisprudence in the context of regulating political prediction markets, because the 
CEA’s regulatory rubric is incoherent when applied to the types of activities that 
market analysts consider to be manipulation in political prediction markets.
The CFTC operates pursuant to the CEA, which regulates the trading of 
commodities markets in the United States.107 Under the CEA, the CFTC has 
exclusive jurisdiction over commodity options and commodity futures contracts.108
103 Hansen et al., supra note 91, at 462.
104 See generally New York Times Company: Press: Ethics in Journalism, Avoiding Market 
Conflicts, available at http://www.nytco.com/press/ethics.html#avoiding (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) 
(asserting ethical journalism principles under the assumption that journalists have the responsibility to 
“regularly cover business and financial news”); U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of . . . the press . . . .”).  
105 See discussion supra Part III.
106 See generally Rhode & Strumpf, supra note 58, at 6-7 (distinguishing “manipulation” in 
political prediction markets from manipulation in derivative markets because “[t]here are no underlying 
assets in political stock markets, and so manipulation can only be detected using data from the 
prediction market alone,” but not justifying this claim or analyzing its legal implications).
107 Commodity Exchange Act § 1, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (2006).
108 Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts, 73 Fed. Reg. at 
25,670. Section 4c(b) of the CEA gives the CFTC plenary jurisdiction over commodity options, and 
provides that “[n]o person shall . . . enter into . . . any transaction involving any commodity regulated 
under this Act which is of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, an option . . . contrary 
to any rule, regulation or order of the Commission [.]”  Id. Section 2(a)(1)(A) awards the Commission 
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If public prediction markets fall under the jurisdiction of the CFTC and are 
regulated under the CEA, then the question arises whether the CEA’s anti-
manipulation jurisprudence can apply to political prediction markets.  
The CEA does not contain any explicit statutory definition of the term 
manipulation.109 However, § 13(a)(2) makes it a felony for “[a]ny person to 
manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of any commodity in interstate 
commerce,” and § 13(b) specifically prohibits “[a]ny person [from] 
manipulate[ing] or attempt[ing] to manipulate the price of any commodity in 
interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any 
registered entity.”110 Congress may have intentionally left the term manipulation 
undefined, because it wanted to cast a wide net and cover all types of conduct that 
someone seeking to affect market prices could perform.111 After all, “[t]he 
methods and techniques of manipulation are limited only by the ingenuity of 
man.”112 The analysis of whether manipulation has occurred in a commodities 
market is usually highly fact-specific.113
Although the CEA’s anti-manipulation jurisprudence has been described as 
“a murky miasma of questionable analysis and unclear effect,”114 a four-part test 
has emerged which federal courts and the CFTC use to evaluate manipulation on 
commodity futures markets.115 Under the four-part test, the following elements 
must be established by a preponderance of the evidence before a court will 
determine that manipulation has occurred on a commodity futures market: (1) the 
accused had the ability to influence market prices; (2) the accused specifically 
intended to influence market prices; (3) artificial prices existed; and (4) the 
accused caused the artificial prices.116 Moreover, a claim of attempted 
manipulation requires proof of the following two elements: (1) intent to affect 
market prices; and (2) an overt act in furtherance thereof.117
The legal test for manipulation and attempted manipulation under the CEA is 
an extraordinarily difficult test to apply.118
exclusive jurisdiction with respect to accounts, agreements, and transactions (including options) 
involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery.  Id.
The difficulty is due to the resource-
109 Volkart Bros., Inc., v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 58 (5th Cir. 1962).
110 7 U.S.C. at § 13(a)(2), (b)(2).
111 Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices—The Unprosecutable Crime, 8 
YALE J. ON REG. 281, 360 (1991).
112 Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971).
113 In re Soybean Futures Litig., 892 F. Supp. 1025, 1044 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
114 TIMOTHY J. SNIDER, 2 REGULATION OF THE COMMODITIES FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKETS § 
12.01, at 12-15 (2d ed. 1995).
115 E.g., Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 244 F.R.D. 469, 481 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (stating four-part test 
for manipulation).
116 Id.
117 E.g., CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, L.L.C., 554 F. Supp. 2d 523, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
118 For in-depth analyses of the four-part test, see generally EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, THE 
MECHANICS AND REGULATION OF MARKET ABUSE: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 104 (2005);
Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in Financial Markets?, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 503 (1991); Jerry W. Markham et al., Market Manipulation—From Star Chamber to 
Lone Star, 23 NO. 8 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. 7 (2003) [hereinafter Markham et al., Star 
Chamber]; Markham, supra note 111; Matthijs Nelemans, Redefining Trade-Based Market 
Manipulation, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1169 (2008); Wendy Collins Perdue, Manipulation of Futures 
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intensive investigation required, the complexity between the market variables 
involved in an artificial price and the mind-reading problems of proving intent, 
among other challenges.119 The conceptual vagueness of these elements makes 
their application a “daunting, indeed impossible, task for the CFTC staff.”120
According to one commentator, manipulation in commodities markets is “virtually 
an unprosecutable crime” due to the difficulty of applying the CEA’s anti-
manipulation doctrine.121
B. The Incoherence of “Artificial Price”
As hard as it is to apply the doctrine to commodity 
exchange markets, it is downright incoherent to apply the doctrine to political 
prediction markets.
The elements of the CEA’s anti-manipulation doctrine hinge on the concept 
of an artificial price.  There is no single test for what constitutes an artificial price 
in a commodity futures market.  Every test presents its own problems—commodity 
futures market scholars find that the task of defining what constitutes an artificial 
price is “a very perilous exercise.”122 Despite the difficulties, it appears that three 
of the predominant tests that courts and the CFTC have developed for “artificial 
price” in commodity futures markets depend upon the relationship between the 
futures contract and the value of an “underlying cash asset,”123 and two of the tests 
depend upon a “historical relationship” between similar futures contracts compared 
against each other in different time periods.124
Regarding the underlying cash asset relationship, the first test defines an 
artificial price as a price that diverges from basic forces of supply and demand.
In the political prediction market 
context, the concepts of underlying cash asset and historical relationships are 
incoherent.  Therefore, the main five tests for artificial price developed under the 
CEA all fail to analogize meaningfully to political prediction markets. 
125
The standard technique to determine whether the basic forces of supply and 
demand are being violated in a commodity futures market is to look for squeezes 
and corners in the underlying deliverable assets.126
Markets: Redefining the Offense, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 345 (1987); Craig Pirrong, Commodity Market 
Manipulation Law: A (Very) Critical Analysis and a Proposed Alternative, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
945 (1994).
A “corner” is a situation where 
119 Markham, supra note 111, at 356-57.
120 Id. at 357.
121 Id. at 356.
122 AVGOULEAS, supra note 118, at 109.
123 Rhode & Strumpf, supra note 58, at 6-7.
124 In re Cox, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,786, at 34,064-66 
(C.F.T.C. 1987) (analyzing “Historical Market Comparisons” and “Cash Market Price Comparisons” in 
assessing whether price was artificial); Great W. Food Distrib., Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 482-83 
(7th Cir. 1953) (discussing the three methods that the government sought to show an abnormal price in 
egg futures); Benjamin E. Kozinn, Note, The Great Copper Caper: Is Market Manipulation Really a 
Problem in the Wake of the Sumitomo Debacle?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 243, 261-62 n.146 (2000) 
(citing Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1167-68 (8th Cir. 1971) (addressing the various 
approaches that the government argued demonstrated the existence of an artificial price)). 
125 Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971).
126 Rhode & Strumpf, supra note 58, at 6 (citing Craig Pirrong, Detecting Manipulation in Futures 
Markets: The Ferruzzi Soybean Episode, 6 AM. L. &. ECON. REV. 28 (2004); Craig Pirrong, 
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a trader “intentionally causes a price to rise by acquiring a dominant position in the 
futures market and simultaneously achieving sufficient dominance in the cash 
market ‘to dry up the sources of deliverable goods.’”127 A “squeeze” is a situation 
in which “the open interest on the futures market is considerably in excess of the 
deliverable supplies.”128
Moreover, the concept of manipulation based upon a violation of supply and 
demand forces is itself troublesome.  This is because the concept rests on the 
paradoxical notion that there is no such thing as an artificial price if all market 
forces that contribute to shaping a price are considered to be part of legitimate 
supply and demand.
The concepts of corners and squeezes both concern 
abuses of the basic force of supply and demand, and both concepts are inextricably 
linked to cash markets for the underlying commodity.  Political prediction markets 
lack this link to a cash market, and thus the supply and demand test is incoherent 
as applied to political prediction markets.
129 As one scholar explains, “After all, the trader is a part of 
the market.  If he believes a commodity is under priced and seeks advantage, who 
is to say that the resulting price is artificial?”130
A second test compares the futures price to the cash prices of the 
commodity.131 Commodity futures contracts require physical delivery of the 
commodity as a means of settlement.132 This requirement is important because it 
causes futures prices and cash prices to converge.133 This convergence occurs 
because arbitrage is profitable when a price disparity exists, but the arbitrage 
transactions themselves will ultimately force cash and futures price 
convergence.134 Whereas a commodity futures contract has a connection to an 
actual physical commodity that can be delivered in the future or immediately 
received for cash, the political event forming the basis of the political prediction 
market contract has no relationship to any underlying physical commodity that can 
be traded instantly in a cash market or physically delivered in the future.  Political 
prediction markets are even more abstract than futures trading in intangible goods 
such as stock index futures contracts, because at least with stock index futures the 
trader “receives a cash settlement based on the theoretical results of his having 
bought or sold that basket of stocks.”135
Manipulation of the Commodity Futures Market Delivery Process, 66 J. BUS. 335, 335-69 (1993)).
Due to the absence of a cash market basis 
and delivery in the political prediction market context, this second test is also 
incoherent when applied to political prediction markets.
127 Perdue, supra note 118, at 381 n.217 (citing Note, The Delivery Requirement: An Illusory Bar 
to Regulation of Manipulation in Commodity Exchanges, 73 YALE L. J. 171, 175 (1963)).
128 Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1162.
129 Ind. Farm Bureau Coop. Ass’n v. Johnston, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Commodity Futures 
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶21,796 at 27,300 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 17, 1982).
130 Markham et al., Star Chamber, supra note 118.
131 Kozinn, supra note 124, at 262.
132 Perdue, supra note 118, at 381 n.217. 
133 Id. (citing Kenneth D. Garbade & William L. Silber, Cash Settlement of Futures Contracts: An 
Economic Analysis, 3 J. FUTURES MARKETS. 451, 454 (1983)).
134 Id.
135 Robert C. Lower, Disruptions of the Futures Market: A Comment on Dealing with Market 
Manipulation, 8 YALE. J. ON REG. 391, 395 (1991).
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Additionally, a third test analyzes the historical price relationship between 
different Boards of Trade.136 Under this test, the price of commodity futures 
contracts in one market during a given time frame is compared with the price of 
the same type of commodity futures contracts in a different market during the same 
time frame.137
Moving on to the historical relationship puzzle, a fourth test for artificial 
prices in commodity futures markets compares “the price changes of the suspect 
contract during the suspect period with price changes of the same type of contract 
during the same historical period.”
This test is problematic when applied to political prediction 
markets, because these markets lack any cash basis by which to compare market 
prices.  Direct comparisons between the same types of political event contracts in 
the same time period on different political prediction markets do not account for 
whether the benchmark of comparison in any of the markets represents the “true”
value of the contract.  A cash market basis is essential for this third test to provide 
a meaningful basis of comparison, and the test therefore cannot apply to political 
prediction markets.  
138 Under this test, we compare the contract’s 
price during the “suspect period” with the contract’s price movements during the 
same period in earlier years.139 A fifth test for artificial price in commodity futures 
markets evaluates “price movement in the spread . . . in comparison to price 
changes in the previous years’ spreads.”140 This test compares the price difference 
between the futures contract in a particular commodity in one given month as well 
as in the subsequent month.141
While these two historical relationship tests may be sensible in commodity 
futures markets, where the commodities are often agricultural products142 that are 
traded seasonally year after year, both of these tests are incoherent in the political 
prediction market context.  This is because the event forming the basis of the 
political prediction market contract is unique under the strictest meaning of the 
word.143
Although it is true that elections generally occur according to cyclical, 
predictable schedules pursuant to the expiration of pre-determined terms of office, 
the infinite distinct variables surrounding a political election thwart direct 
historical comparison between election cycles, even when the same candidate is 
involved.  It is not fruitful, for example, to analyze the price fluctuations of a 
“George W. Bush will be elected President in 2000” contract’s price with the price 
fluctuations of a “George W. Bush will be elected President in 2004” contract’s
Political events do not have repetitive, cyclical “harvesting” periods.  
Each particular nomination or election can occur only once. 
136 Kozinn, supra note 124, at 261-62.
137 Id. at 262 n.150.
138 Id. 261-62.
139 Id. at 262 n.147.
140 Id. at 262.
141 Id. at 262 n.148.
142 See generally 7 U.S.C. § 1(a)(4) (2006) (defining “commodity” by listing specific agricultural 
products along with “all other goods and articles . . . and all services, rights, and interests in which 
contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in”).
143 The Oxford English Dictionary defines “unique” as “[o]f which there is only one; one and no 
other; single, sole, solitary.”  OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
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price.  Although both markets concern the same candidate for U.S. President, the 
political environments and variance in overall candidate pools were different 
enough to make direct historical price comparison meaningless.
Since the doctrines of artificial price that courts and the CFTC have 
developed in light of the CEA’s anti-manipulation jurisprudence are incoherent 
when applied to political prediction markets, the CFTC cannot utilize this 
jurisprudence if it acquires jurisdiction to regulate political prediction markets.  As 
we see next, the CEA’s doctrinal concept of specific intent to influence market 
price is also incoherent when applied to political prediction markets.
C. The Incoherence of “Specific Intent to Influence Market Price”
The element of specific intent to influence market price is the most elusive 
component of the current CEA anti-manipulation doctrine in the commodity 
futures market context, due to its circumstantial and subjective nature.  After all, 
“it is hard to read people’s minds.”144 Despite the difficulties that arise in defining 
specific intent to influence market prices in commodities markets, the underlying 
basic premise is that manipulators intend to affect the market such that they can 
buy a commodity futures contract at a low price and sell at a high price.145
Commodities market scholar Wendy Collins Perdue starts with the basic 
premise of the CEA’s anti-manipulation doctrine that rational investors try to buy a 
commodity futures contract at a low price and sell at a high price.
As we 
will see, this basic premise is incoherent when applied to political prediction 
markets, because as illustrated in Part III, manipulative traders in political 
prediction markets seek to change the price of the contract in order to influence 
external beliefs about the candidate’s viability.  In the commodity futures market 
context, price change for profit is the manipulator’s end in itself.  In the political 
prediction market context, price change for profit or loss is a means to the 
secondary end of influencing beliefs.
146 Perdue 
explains that a rational, non-manipulative trader seeks to minimize the price 
impacts of his own trades on the commodity futures markets, because doing so will 
enable the trader to obtain the best price.147
Perdue suggests that a trader may indicate manipulative intent when the 
trader purchases a large quantity of a commodity contract and does so in a manner 
that seems designed specifically to increase the price impact of that purchase.
This is because the rational, non-
manipulative trader wants to purchase the contract for the lowest possible price in 
order to obtain the greatest possible profit upon sale at a higher price.  
148
Another indication of manipulative intent is “reaching,” which occurs “when the 
trader makes a bid at a price that is substantially higher, (or lower) than the last bid 
or transaction.”149
144 Fischel & Ross, supra note 118, at 519.
Either activity comports with basic economic rationality, 
145 Perdue, supra note 118, at 393.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 396.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 397.
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because it is the manipulative trader’s goal to make a monetary profit off of the 
market-based trades.  
However, Perdue’s analysis is problematic when applied to the context of 
political prediction markets, because her basic premise—that rational traders on 
commodities futures markets try to buy low and sell high—does not apply to the 
manipulation relevant to political prediction markets.  As illustrated in Part III, 
traders in political prediction markets will purchase event contracts in order to 
influence the beliefs of other market observers, and ultimately policy decisions.  It 
would be politically rational, though not economically rational under the CEA’s 
manipulation doctrine, for a political prediction market trader to try to force the 
price of the contract down if the trader’s object was to indicate that a particular 
candidate was falling out of popular favor.  Prediction market scholar Robin 
Hanson observes that people will make trades on public prediction markets that 
lose money in order to change prices and therefore policy.150 Hanson writes, 
“[e]ven if such trades lost money on average, those losses might be outweighed by 
gains from more favorable policy.”151
Ironically, it is likely politically irrational for traders in political prediction 
markets to structure their trades with the intent to influence beliefs.  Empirical 
research suggests that even the secondary goal of influencing beliefs is not likely 
to be accomplished through contract trading in political prediction markets.  While 
some prediction market traders engage in trade-based manipulation with the intent 
to influence external beliefs, an experiment by prediction market researchers 
suggests that “price manipulation is a largely ineffective strategy for altering the 
beliefs of investors and other decision makers.”
Whereas manipulation in a political 
prediction market is rational if it influences external political belief, manipulation
in a traditional commodities market is rational only if it results in the trader’s own 
monetary gain. The two types of manipulation are not analogous.
152 Although the experiment was 
designed to provide manipulation incentives to some market participants while 
other participants were “kept in the dark about the direction in which manipulation 
incentives ran,” the manipulation did not reduce the accuracy of the third party 
observers’ forecasts.153
In another prediction market experiment, researchers discovered that within 
limited boundaries of experimental design, when a non-manipulative market 
participant suspects the presence of prediction market manipulators and knows the 
direction in which the manipulators are likely to push the price, the manipulation 
efforts are ineffective.
The manipulative trader’s efforts to influence the third 
parties’ beliefs were ineffective, and the effort was an economic and political 
waste.  
154
150 Hanson, supra note 56, at 128.
  This experiment was limited to situations in which all 
the participants knew that prediction market manipulators were present, how 
strong the incentive to manipulate was, and in which direction the manipulators 
151 Id.
152 Ryan Oprea et al., Can Manipulators Mislead Market Observers? 16 (George Mason Univ.,
Working Paper, 2007), available at http://people.ucsc.edu/~roprea/manipEX2.pdf.
153 Id.
154 Robin Hanson et al., Information Aggregation and Manipulation in an Experimental Market, 60 
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 449, 458 (2006), available at http://people.ucsc.edu/~roprea/manipEX1.pdf.
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had an incentive to push the price.155
The authors acknowledge that the experimental conditions of this research 
should be altered in future experimental designs, to uncover more information 
about the robustness of prediction markets to manipulative trading designed to 
influence external beliefs of other market participants or observers.156
Nonetheless, these studies suggest that it does not matter whether prediction 
market traders share the same rational basis to buy low and sell high as 
commodities market traders, because even if prediction market traders trade to 
influence policy rather than maximize personal economic profits pursuant to the 
CEA’s anti-manipulation doctrine, such efforts are likely to be ineffective 
anyway.157
This Part has argued that the concepts of artificial price and specific intent to 
influence market price as developed under the CEA’s anti-manipulation 
jurisprudence are incoherent when applied to political prediction markets.  
Therefore, the CFTC must abandon the CEA’s regime if it acquires jurisdiction 
over political prediction markets.  Part V suggests three different alternatives to the 
CEA regime to address the issue of manipulation in political prediction markets.
V. THREE ALTERNATIVES FOR PREVENTING MANIPULATION IN POLITICAL 
PREDICTION MARKETS
Part IV demonstrated that the concept of manipulation under the CEA’s anti-
manipulation doctrine is incoherent when applied to political prediction markets 
due to the nature of the concepts of artificial price and specific intent to influence 
market prices as developed under the CEA’s jurisprudence.  Part V now presents 
three alternatives to the CEA’s regime that the CFTC can choose to adopt if it 
acquires jurisdiction over political prediction markets.  These three alternatives 
are: (1) the CFTC can develop a revised anti-manipulation doctrine with elements 
that are coherent when applied to political election markets; (2) the CFTC can 
encourage private contracting between market participants to prohibit certain 
trading activities; or (3) the CFTC can take no action and simply allow political 
prediction markets themselves to control manipulation through self-deterrence 
mechanisms.
A. Designing a New Regulatory Regime
Since the anti-manipulation doctrine involving artificial price and specific 
intent to influence market prices under the CEA is incoherent when applied to 
political prediction markets, the CFTC and courts may develop a new set of tests to 
apply when analyzing whether a trader has manipulated or attempted to manipulate 
a political prediction market.  
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 These studies generally relate to the notion that trade-based price manipulation in both 
commodity futures markets and political prediction markets is self-deterring.  See discussion infra, Part 
V.C.
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One approach is for the courts and the CFTC to develop a set of objective 
factors that can be observed and discovered ex post.158 The ex post approach 
avoids the “mind reading” exercise typically involved in discerning specific intent.  
Under the ex post approach, where it is found that a trader engaged in specific 
prohibited practices in the political prediction markets, CFTC regulation would be 
necessary, but the trader’s intent to influence the beliefs of outside observers 
would only be relevant at the sanctions stage.159
Several ex post factors that the CFTC and the courts could analyze to discern 
whether a trader attempted to manipulate a political prediction markets are 1) 
whether the purchase price of the contract was substantially above the market 
price; 2) whether the purchases were made rapidly at increasingly higher prices; 3) 
whether extremely large purchases were made relative to the market as a whole;160
None of these ex post factors would be outcome-determinative as to whether 
the trader attempted to manipulate the political prediction market.  However, they 
at least provide some starting factors that the CFTC and courts could consider in 
combination when analyzing whether the trader engaged in manipulation with the 
ultimate intent to influence the beliefs of external market observers.
4) whether a single trader spent a significant amount of money on contracts for a 
single candidate; 5) whether the resulting price of the candidate’s contract after the 
trade is significantly different from the political poll data for that candidate; 6) 
whether arbitrage opportunities existed between different political prediction 
market boards of trade after the attempted manipulative trading has occurred; 7) 
whether the trader in question is affiliated with a political party; 8) whether the 
candidate endorses policies that would personally benefit or hurt the trader or 
parties in privity with the trader; and 9) whether the trader has a history of 
contributing to political campaigns.
Rather than prevent market manipulation with criteria that identifies 
problematic objective behaviors indicative of manipulative intent ex post, some 
scholars argue that unwanted market behavior should be policed ex ante through 
the use of affirmative regulation.161  Writing in the context of combating 
manipulation in commodity future markets, Jerry Markham argues that the CFTC 
should engage in intensive surveillance.162 This surveillance would continue 
throughout the life of the commodity futures contract, in order, for example, “to 
see if large traders are affecting prices through their trades and whether these 
positions are so large that they should be required to liquidate well before the 
delivery period.”163
158 See generally Markham, supra note 111, at 369 (offering objective factors in the commodity 
futures market context).
In addition to this intensive daily surveillance, Markham 
proposes limits on the amount of short trading that any one commodity futures 
159 Id.
160 See id. (citing CFTC DIVISION OF TRADING AND MARKETS, ANALYSIS OF TRADING IN THE 
CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE’S MAJOR MARKET INDEX FUTURES CONTRACT ON OCTOBER 20, 1987, at 
1-2 (1988)).
161 Id. at 375.
162 Id. at 365.
163 Id.
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trader can engage in on a single day,164 and advocates for an automatic order 
execution system for small orders that would minimize petty theft.165
As a policy matter, Markham argues that strict affirmative regulation is 
required in the commodity futures market context for the trading public to gain 
confidence in the “highly innovative and still-growing futures industry.”166
Markham writes that the alternative to aggressive, affirmative regulation is “to 
declare that the manipulation of commodity prices is an unprosecutable crime in 
which traders may engage with no regard for the effect upon the consumer and the 
economy in general.”167 His tone suggests that it would be disgraceful for our 
government to concede that manipulation is unprosecutable.168
Markham’s argument in favor of ex ante affirmative regulation is powerful 
in the political prediction market context, because public acceptance of the markets 
as legitimate is crucial if these markets are to grow on a large scale.  The mere fact 
that prediction markets are novel, complex and anonymous causes some concern 
for market abuse.169 John Delaney, the CEO of Intrade.com, is concerned enough 
about the effect of political prediction market “manipulation” on public confidence 
in these markets that he has solicited feedback on the matter in a public online 
forum.170
Several scholars have posited reasons why manipulation in public prediction 
markets is troubling.  The most emotionally compelling argument against 
manipulation of prediction markets is that it undermines potential market 
participants’ belief in the integrity of the market, and therefore discourages them 
from participating.171 Eric Zitzewitz points out, “[p]eople have a taste for 
institutional integrity itself.”172 Zitzewitz also notes that the possibility for 
manipulation creates bad incentive effects, and manipulation relies on surprise, 
which is a source of vexation for honest prediction market participants.173
However, Markham’s approach to affirmative ex ante regulation has several 
drawbacks.  First, even Markham acknowledges that the greatest danger from this 
type of affirmative regulation is that it “might strangle the markets and stifle 
164 Markham, supra note 111, at 368.
165 Id. at 373-74.
166 Id. at 373, 375.
167 Id. at 375.
168 See generally id. at 375-76 (discussing the significant societal costs resulting from manipulated 
artificial prices). 
169 Robin Hanson & Ryan Oprea, A Manipulator Can Aid Prediction Market Accuracy, 76 
ECONOMICA 304, 312 (2009)
170 Posting of John Delaney, CEO, Intrade.com, to Google Groups—Prediction Markets,
http://groups.google.com/group/Prediction-
Markets/browse_thread/thread/7d88abc019dc6552/249a39a22a9422ab (July 31, 2008, 00:30 PDT).
171 See Michael Giberson, Deep-Pocketed Manipulators are a Prediction Market’s Friend, July 8, 
2007, http://www.midasoracle.org/2007/07/08/deep-pocketed-manipulators-are-a-prediction-market%
E2%80%99s-friend/.
172 See Eric Zitzewitz, Is Manipulation Good for a Prediction Market?  Accuracy Isn’t Everything,
July 9, 2007, http://www.midasoracle.org/2007/07/09/is-manipulation-good-for-a-prediction-market-
accuracy-isnt-everything/.
173 Id.
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innovation.”174 There is a risk that potential traders will be overly-deterred from 
participation due to fear of legal repercussions for “questionable” trades.175
Second, some commentators fear that Markham’s approach to strong 
government regulation could obscure the underlying economic information on 
commodity futures markets.  Robert Lower argues, “[w]ith the CFTC acting as a 
‘hands-on’ policeman and occasional market participant, the markets could easily 
become governed by political considerations having nothing to do with the 
economic factors affecting price.”
In a 
newly developing field such as political prediction markets, it is desirable to invite 
wide participation without threatening participants with stiff regulations that will 
prevent them from exploring and experimenting with this new market medium.
176 Political actors would seek to control the 
price of commodities having a disproportionately influential effect in their 
constituents’ region.177
Lower’s worry suggests that governmental regulatory intervention will 
obscure the underlying prediction price data, thus resulting in inferior predictive 
ability of these markets.178 Analogizing to the political prediction market context, 
Gary Becker fears that political prediction markets with distorted underlying price 
data are less reliable as predictors of outcomes.179
B. Private Contract Solutions
These considerations indicate 
that aggressive affirmative regulation of prediction markets is not the best solution 
to manipulation in political prediction markets.
Rather than monitor manipulation in the political prediction market through 
either ex post or ex ante regulation, the CFTC could encourage private contractual 
solutions to curb manipulative trading activities.  Private contract solutions provide 
an alternative to aggressive governmental regulation of manipulation in public 
prediction markets.  Gaining insight from the commodities market context, some 
scholars have argued that governmental regulation of commodity futures market 
manipulation is unnecessary because the exchanges that offer these futures 
contracts have a private incentive to regulate manipulation.180 To attract business, 
compete with other exchanges, and compete with other securities markets, private 
exchanges have the incentive to adopt contract terms and trading rules that reduce 
the costs of manipulation.181
This observation is easily applied to the prediction market context generally.  
174 Markham, supra note 111, at 375.
175 See generally Fischel & Ross, supra note 118, at 523 (“Even a seemingly narrow legal rule 
focusing on ‘clear’ evidence of manipulative intent (assuming such ‘clear’ evidence exists) is unlikely 
to provide net social benefits.  Any rule that addresses the difficult problem of identifying manipulative 
conduct risks overdeterrence—causing society to bear the costs of foregone beneficial activity.”).
176 Lower, supra note 135, at 397. 
177 See id.
178 Id. at 398.
179 See generally Posting of Gary Becker to The Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com/archives/2008/09/political_predi.html (Sept. 14, 2008, 05:33 EST).
180 Fischel & Ross, supra note 118, at 549.
181 Id.
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In fact, Cantor Futures Exchange, L.P. (“Cantor”), presumably in anticipation of 
imminent CFTC regulation of public prediction markets, recently filed an 
application with the CFTC to become a fully regulated futures exchange.182 In its 
application, Cantor expressed its intent to list contracts on domestic movie box 
office receipts.183 This course of action would constitute a public prediction 
market in which traders predict the total gross domestic box office receipts in the 
United States and Canada in U.S. dollars.184 Notably, Cantor’s application 
includes private contractual provisions to control manipulation on its box office 
exchange.185
Box office receipt prediction markets can suffer from the same types of 
manipulation as political prediction markets.  Traders in box office receipt 
contracts may seek to influence the beliefs of outside observers as to the movie’s 
commercial appeal and success to persuade others to attend the film in the theater.  
Unfortunately, Cantor does not define the term manipulation in its application.  If 
the private contractual solutions were applied to political prediction markets, 
parties would be well-advised to define manipulation clearly to avoid the 
interpretive difficulties discussed in Part IV.
Although private contracts avoid some of the problems associated with 
aggressive governmental regulation, these private contractual solutions pose 
several problems of their own.  As Fischel and Ross acknowledge in the 
commodities market context, “rules designed to prevent the exercise of market 
power also reduce the return to information about future prices and thus reduce the 
incentive for market participants to gather such information.”186
182 Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P., Application for Contract Market Designation Compliance with 
Designation Criteria and Core Principles, http://www.cftc.gov/stellent/groups/public/@requestsand
actions/documents/ifdocs/cantordcmcompliancechart.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2010).
This reduction in 
information gathering incentives would be highly problematic in the political 
prediction market context, in which the incentive to gather information is one of 
183 Cantor Futures Exchange, L.P., Domestic Box Office Receipts: Contract Rules, 
http://www.cftc.gov/stellent/groups/public/@requestsandactions/documents/ifdocs/cantordborcontractte
rmsandcond.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2010).
184 Id.
185 Id.  Under section III-3, Execution of the Pre-Opening Auction, the Contract Rules state:
(c) Prior to closing the Pre-Opening Auction, the Exchange will determine . . . 
whether any bids or offers . . . may potentially be part of a manipulation or 
attempted manipulation of the relevant DBOR Contract, or may otherwise be in 
violation of Exchange Rules.  In making this determination, the Exchange will 
consider and examine, among other things, any large quantities that the Exchange 
determines to be inappropriate, or patterns of orders that might be considered 
disruptive to the auction process.  The Exchange may request, and Participants 
shall provide, any additional information or documentation reasonably requested 
by the Exchange in connection with its consideration of these issues.  The 
Exchange shall have the authority to reject or cancel any bids or offers that it 
determines to be part of a manipulation or attempted manipulation, or that are 
otherwise not in accordance with the Rules of the Exchange, including these 
DBOR Contract Rules.
Id.; see also Cantor Futures Exchange, L.P. Rules, VI-5. http://www.cftc.gov/stellent/groups/public/
@requestsandactions/documents/ifdocs/cantordcmrules.pdf (“Any manipulation of the market in any 
Contract is prohibited.”) (last visited Feb. 19, 2010).
186 Fischel & Ross, supra note 118, at 549.
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the prime virtues of such a market.187
Another problem is whether the private contractual rules adopted by the 
public prediction market exchange will adopt the optimal amount of precautions 
against manipulation, however it is defined.188 The optimal precaution level 
against manipulation in private contractual agreement occurs when the marginal 
private gains equal the marginal private costs, and the private gains and costs 
approximate the social gains and costs.189
In the commodities market context, scholars disagree about whether the level 
of precautions against manipulation undertaken by private contracting parties will 
approximate the social gains and costs.  On the one hand, some believe this 
convergence is likely because “traders on the futures market are those who bear 
most of the costs and receive most of the gains from trading in these markets.”190
On the other hand, some scholars are concerned that the private contractors 
will not take the optimal amount of precautions because “exchanges do not take 
into account the interests of those who are affected by futures prices but do not 
participate in the futures market.”
If the privately contracting traders capture nearly all the benefits or burdens of the 
trades resulting from private agreement, then the private and social costs do 
converge almost completely.
191
Fischel and Ross dispose of this concern by arguing that private contracts 
formed between traders do take into account the needs of outside market 
observers.
The dispute here is whether the privately 
contracting traders do in fact capture all (or nearly all) of the benefits of the 
contract themselves, and whether they need to be concerned with the interests of 
outside market observers.
192 This is because outside observers of commodities markets (such as 
farmers who look at futures prices to determine how much to plant) participate in 
spot markets for the commodity.193 They explain that “[s]peculators in futures 
markets take positions that ensure that futures prices reflect the information in spot 
markets (and vice versa)” and that “[t]his interaction between spot and futures 
markets may provide incentives for exchanges to take the spot market into account 
in determining what precautions to take.”194
The issue of whether privately contracting parties will adopt the optimal 
level of precautions against manipulation in the political prediction market context 
raises particular difficulties in light of Fischel and Ross’s theories.  First of all, 
whereas in the commodity futures context it is at least arguable that the privately 
contracting parties capture nearly all the benefits or burdens of the trades resulting 
from the private agreement, this notion is false in the political prediction market 
187 See discussion supra Part II.
188 Fischel & Ross, supra note 118, at 549 n.200.
189 Id.
190 Id. (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopoly, Manipulation, and the Regulation of Futures 
Markets, 59 J. BUS. S103, S113 (1986)).
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Fischel & Ross, supra note 118, at 549 n.200.
194 Id.
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context.  As discussed in Part III,195
Secondly, the solution by which Fischel and Ross dispose of the optimal 
precaution concern cannot be analogized to political prediction markets.  Whereas 
Fischel and Ross argue that the existence of a spot market provides incentives for 
private contracting parties to adopt the optimal precautions against manipulation in 
commodity futures markets, there is no analogous spot market for the events 
underlying political prediction markets.  In a commodities market a trader can, for 
example, simultaneously purchase frozen orange juice concentrate immediately on 
a spot market as well as purchase futures contracts for the frozen concentrate.  In 
contrast, a trader on the political prediction market cannot simultaneously discern 
the final vote counts of an actual election while purchasing contracts on the 
political prediction market for the same exact election.
concerns about manipulation in political 
prediction markets are based upon the influence of the trades on external market 
observers.  Outside observers look at the market prices to analyze the viability of a 
political candidate, and this can influence the outsider’s own votes.  Therefore it is 
not a colorable argument to suggest that private and social costs will converge 
completely through private contracting where political prediction markets are 
concerned.
These failures of analogy between private contractual solution for 
manipulation in commodity futures markets and political prediction markets 
suggest that private contracts would not solve the problems of manipulation in 
political prediction markets.  If affirmative government regulation and private 
contractual solutions both fail in the political prediction market context, perhaps a 
third solution—self-deterrence—can solve the problem of manipulation in these 
markets.  We now turn to this possibility.
C.  Self-Deterrence of Manipulative Trading
In the context of commodity futures markets, Fischel and Ross offer an 
argument that manipulation on commodity futures markets is self-deterring and 
thus not in need of a regulatory regime.  First, they observe that the acquisition of 
market power requires a large amount of capital, and this by itself is a deterrent to 
manipulative efforts.196 Second, they argue that manipulation on commodity 
markets is self-deterring because of how risky such efforts are.  A manipulator 
must withhold supplies of a commodity to cause a price increase, but such 
behavior is risky because after the futures contract expires, the demand is likely to 
be much more elastic.197 The manipulator does not necessarily have the ability to 
obtain a high price for the contract after its expiration.198 Therefore, the would-be 
manipulator “has no assurance that the price at expiration will yield him a profit,”
and thus attempted manipulations in futures markets are “extremely risky.”199
The concept of manipulation on political prediction markets is also likely 
195 See discussion supra Part III.
196 Fischel & Ross, supra note 118, at 547.
197 Id. at 547–48.
198 Id. at 548.
199 Id.
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self-deterring.  The cost of manipulation is high,200 the chance of profiting 
financially is low,201 and the prices are usually altered for only a short period of 
time.202 Alert market participants can profit off the manipulated prices, so the 
manipulator essentially subsidizes the profit-making ability of the non-
manipulators.203 Moreover, as expressed in Part IV.C, price manipulation is 
largely ineffective in influencing the beliefs of observers outside the market.204
Saul Levmore supports the self-deterrence theory by observing, “[M]uch as 
there is money to be made in manipulation, there is money to be made in counter-
manipulation.”205 He explains that the market itself will generate “corrective 
entrepreneurs and activities” that oppose manipulation, and that the free market 
will “prove superior to government-sponsored regulators even at the task of 
regulation itself.”206
VI. CONCLUSION: URGING REGULATORY RESTRAINT
The self-deterrence theory concludes that because market 
forces and private incentives make manipulative attempts costly, risky, and 
ineffective, market manipulators will be deterred from attempting to engage in 
such activities.  Governmental regulation of these activities would be superfluous, 
costly, and unnecessary.
This Article has argued that the CEA’s current anti-manipulation doctrine is 
incoherent as applied to political prediction markets.207 Additionally, it has 
suggested that both aggressive governmental regulation and private contractual 
solutions are problematic.208 Self-deterrence within the market structure itself may 
be the best solution for preventing manipulation in political predication markets.209
Robin Hanson explains that the low impact of manipulation in prediction 
markets is due to the high level of “noise trades” in these markets.
For this reason, the CFTC should exercise restraint in designing an anti-
manipulation regime towards political prediction markets, if it acquires jurisdiction 
over these markets.  Beyond the possibility that self-deterrence is the best solution, 
this Article concludes with an additional reason why the CFTC should exercise 
regulatory restraint: empirical experiments suggest that manipulation may actually 
improve the predictive accuracy of these markets.
210
200 Id.; see discussion supra Part III.B.
Trades are 
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non-informational reasons.211 Manipulation is merely another type of noise 
trading, and those traders holding real information have the opportunity to make a 
profit off of those participants who are trading for reasons other than for revealing 
accurate information about the underlying event probability.212 Moreover, 
manipulation “should not add any systematic bias, and the prospect of 
manipulation should increase liquidity and thus reduce noise overall.”213
Hanson observes that non-manipulative participants will alter their behavior 
in two ways to profit off of the manipulative or “noise traders.” First, they will 
trade at a higher volume for any information they hold because doing so will 
increase their expected profits.214 Second, and most significantly, they will 
increase their efforts to obtain relevant and accurate information to beat the price 
set by the manipulative trader.215
The second behavior is important because these efforts to obtain accurate 
information mean that on average, more noise trading should increase price 
accuracy.216  Hanson explains that empirically “it seems that financial and 
information markets with more noise trading, and hence a large trading volume, 
tend to be more accurate, all else being equal.”217 This is because the presence of 
manipulative traders induces more effort by informed traders, and this explains the 
typical failure of most manipulation attempts.218
In one of Hanson and Oprea’s empirical studies, the authors discovered that 
in a thin prediction market with a known manipulator possessing definite price 
objectives, the presence of the manipulator actually increased the accuracy of the 
market price.219 The presence of a manipulator motivated other traders to gather 
information, and this additional information resulted in greater expected financial 
rewards for the non-manipulative traders.220  The manipulator’s known presence 
therefore “indirectly increases the accuracy of the market price as an estimate of 
fundamental asset value.”221
211 See id.
Although their experiment focused on thin prediction 
markets, Hanson and Oprea note that the largest financial markets have the most 
accurate information and prices because other traders who anticipate a large 
volume of noise trades in the larger market will change their trading behavior in 
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response.222
These empirical findings indicate that manipulation might actually be good
for political prediction markets.  Additional research is needed, but in the 
meantime such data suggests that the CFTC, if it acquires jurisdiction, should not 
hastily seek to regulate apparently manipulative trading on political prediction 
markets if doing so will prevent these markets from reaching their most accurate 
potential.
222 Id. at 12.
